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Preface
The stability of the international financial system is in doubt. Analysis of
the system has focused mainly on the sustainability of financing the U.S.
trade deficit and has failed to understand the microeconomics of transac-
tions within the system. According to this brief by Thomas I. Palley, the
international financial system is unsustainable for reasons of demand, not
supply. He recommends a global system of managed exchange rates to
replace the current system before it crashes, along with the U.S. economy.
East Asian economies are pursuing export-led growth and running
huge trade surpluses with the United States by actively pursuing policies
aimed at maintaining undervalued exchange rates.Their governments con-
tinue to accumulate U.S. financial assets in order to support and stabilize
the international financial system. While East Asian policymakers are cor-
rect in their belief that they can improve economic outcomes through
exchange rate intervention, the system is undermining the structure of
income and aggregate demand and eroding U.S. manufacturing capacity.
According to Palley, the core problems concern capital mobility and
exchange rates. The U.S. Treasury is actively promoting liberalization of
China’s capital markets, along with floating exchange rates—a process that
could eventually trigger a depreciation of the renminbi. Capital market
openness and renminbi depreciation would adversely affect the U.S.industrial
base,so the Treasury’s policies are the diametric opposite of U.S.needs today.
Palley conjectures that the real reason why the international financial
system is unsustainable may lie with the U.S. domestic credit market. The
system depends on continuation of the U.S. consumption boom, yet cir-
cumstances such as recession and reductions in lending and in voluntary
consumer spending could end the boom.The bottom line is that the global
financial system is vulnerable to a crash originating from within the United
States—and East Asian economies, which would experience a reduction in
 6 Public Policy Brief, No. 85
exports, foreign direct investment, and employment, can do little about it.
Escaping a consumer-led recession in the United States will be difficult,
because the options that were employed to overcome recession in 2001 are
no longer available. Moreover, the dollar may not fall very much against
other currencies, so there could be a prolonged economic slump.
Palley calls for a new financial system that addresses both the root
cause of the 1997 East Asian financial crisis (destabilizing capital mobility)
and current exchange rate problems that have created today’s global finan-
cial imbalances. In reality, both the periphery (East Asia) and the center
(United States) need to agree about the rules of intervention to protect tar-
get exchange rates. Furthermore, the onus of exchange rate intervention
needs to be reversed: the country with the stronger currency should be
responsible for preventing appreciation, rather than the country with the
weaker currency being responsible for preventing depreciation.
As always, I welcome your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
June 2006The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 7
Introduction
Dooley,Folkerts-Landau,and Garber,to whom I refer as DFG,suggest in a
series of papers (2003, 2004a, 2004b) that today’s international financial
system has structural similarities with the Bretton Woods arrangement that
held sway between 1946 and 1971. Export-led growth by developing coun-
tries figures heavily in their analysis, and the authors have done the eco-
nomics profession a major service by reminding us that export-led growth
can have significant international macroeconomic effects.
1
This brief agrees with DFG’s emphasis on export-led growth,but chal-
lenges their comparison of today’s financial system and Bretton Woods.
This brief also differs from DFG’s conclusion that today’s system is sustain-
able in the medium term, and I argue that the system is prone to crash.
Other authors (Eichengreen 2004, Goldstein and Lardy 2005) have also
argued that the system will crash, but they use different arguments, which
focus on sustaining the financing of the U.S. trade deficit. I focus on the
demand-side inadequacies of the current financial system and recommend
a global system of managed exchange rates to replace the current system
before it crashes, along with the U.S. economy.
The Revised Bretton Woods Hypothesis 
The DFG hypothesis is that today’s international financial system struc-
turally resembles the post–World War II Bretton Woods system, which
included fixed exchange rates and was,according to their analysis,a center-
periphery system, where the United States was the center and war-ravaged
Europe was the developing periphery. Within this framework, the United
States proceeded to run progressively growing trade deficits with Europe
that eventually caused a slow demise of the system.
The Fallacy of the Revised Bretton 
Woods Hypothesis
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DFG argue that today’s global financial system still has the United
States at the center of the system, but East Asia (especially China) has re-
placed Europe as the developing periphery. China has an explicitly fixed
exchange rate vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar, while other East Asian economies
actively manage their exchange rates to limit appreciation against the dol-
lar. Additionally, the East Asia region is currently running huge trade sur-
pluses with the United States.
The economic logic behind today’s financial system is that East Asian
economies are pursuing export-led growth. Because these economies lack
robust domestic demand, exports are needed to keep their factories oper-
ating.Export success then serves to attract large-scale foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) that creates jobs, builds manufacturing capacity, and transfers
technology.Foreign investors finance this capital accumulation by providing
the foreign exchange to purchase capital goods. They also transfer, install,
and operate the installed capital.In this fashion,countries acquire jobs and
a modern, internationally competitive, manufacturing sector.
2
The price that the developing periphery must pay,however,is exports to
the center. This arrangement explains why savings flow north from poor to
rich countries, rather than from rich to poor countries, as predicted by con-
ventional, intertemporal, consumption-smoothing models of the interna-
tional economy. Since international competitiveness is the key to export-led
growth,countries actively pursue policies aimed at maintaining undervalued
exchange rates. This explains why China has refused to revalue its exchange
rate despite a massive and growing trade surplus, and why there is an accu-
mulation of dollar-denominated official reserves throughout East Asia.
The Misplaced Analogy with Bretton Woods 
DFG’s analogy of the present international financial system with Bretton
Woods rests on a number of similar macroeconomic patterns, including
quasi-fixed exchange rates and persistent and growing U.S. trade deficits
that are financed by the periphery. However, the analogy is wrong because
it ignores the fundamentally different microeconomic regimes that charac-
terize the two systems.
Three significant differences mark today’s international financial 
system and Bretton Woods. First, today’s trade deficits are the result of
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export-led growth, predicated upon undervalued exchange rates. Bretton
Woods was designed to prevent “beggar-thy-neighbor” trade, based on
competitive devaluations that had afflicted the international economy dur-
ing the Great Depression. Although Germany’s exchange rate alignment
became significantly undervalued in the Bretton Woods system, that result
did not apply to the British pound. Furthermore, the Bretton Woods sys-
tem had formal provisions that allowed countries with structural trade
deficits to devalue their currencies.
Second,under today’s financial system,multinational corporations are
establishing state-of-the-art export platforms in China, where production
is exported back to the center (the United States). This arrangement con-
trasts with the European situation in the 1950s and 1960s, when American
multinationals established production facilities in Europe to supply the
European market.Companies such as Ford,General Motors,and IBM pro-
duced in Europe for Europeans,rather than for export to the United States.
Likewise, European capital accumulation was primarily intended for
European markets.
Third, the growing U.S. trade deficits in the 1960s were driven by full
employment in the United States,along with higher wages,a growing manu-
facturing sector, and increasing manufacturing employment. These deficits
contrast with current U.S. trade deficits, which are driven by debt-financed
consumption spending (supported by a housing price bubble), and imports
are displacing U.S. manufacturing. Whereas U.S. trade deficits in the 1960s
were consistent with the generation of robust and stable aggregate demand,
the current financial system is undermining the structure of the income and
aggregate demand process and eroding manufacturing capacity.
Why the Current Financial Regime Will Fail 
DFG maintain that the current financial system is sustainable and can last
for a long while. The system is sustainable, they say, because the current
arrangement suits both U.S. and East Asian interests—particularly the
Chinese. The steady flow of imports that constitutes the U.S. trade deficit
provides cheap consumption goods that lower consumer prices and contain
inflation,enabling the Fed to hold the line on interest rates despite reduced
unemployment rates. In addition, East Asian countries contribute to the
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favorable interest-rate environment by recycling their trade surpluses into
U.S.Treasury bonds,as part of their strategy to maintain undervalued cur-
rencies vis-à-vis the dollar.
East Asia benefits from exporting to the United States, as its factories
are fully employed. Export success spurs domestic investment and FDI in
manufacturing, which fuels further growth and development. These bene-
fits are especially important to China,which needs to create jobs rapidly in
order to absorb rural migration to its cities; if jobs are not forthcoming,
social and political unrest could erupt to threaten Communist Party rule.
The benefits mean that East Asian governments are willing to continue
accumulating U.S.financial assets,thus ensuring a steady stream of financ-
ing for the U.S.trade deficit at current interest and exchange rates.For East
Asian countries,portfolio risk and return are not the driving force of finan-
cial investment decisions. The driving force is economic growth.
This configuration of national economic interests is underwritten
politically by U.S. multinational corporations. Given their East Asian
investments and the profitability of subcontracted production, these cor-
porations are willing to lobby Washington against “protectionist”pressures
that are generated by the U.S. trade deficit and deindustrialization in the
United States.The fact that the dollar is no longer officially convertible into
gold adds extra stability to the current system and avoids the weakness that
brought down the original Bretton Woods system.
3
A.The Current System Is Unstable 
DFG’s claim regarding the stability of the international financial system has
been challenged by several authors.Eichengreen (2004) argues that the sys-
tem will collapse because of inconsistencies between the system and the
financial interests of individual countries. While it is true that the current
system delivers export-led growth for East Asian economies, those coun-
tries are obliged to accumulate massive dollar reserves. These accumula-
tions are unwise from a portfolio standpoint: they lack diversification and
expose countries to massive capital losses if the dollar falls in value (equiv-
alent to several percentage points of GDP).As a result,individual countries
have an incentive to diversify their reserve holdings, even though they 
benefit from the system as a whole.In effect,this is a classic cartel problem,
because there are incentives to cheat the system.
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Eichengreen’s analysis raises two objections. The first concerns his argu-
ment that placement of reserves elsewhere by East Asian countries will
bring down the system. The principal option is the euro. Purchase of East
Asian currencies, especially the yen, is also an option, as is buying gold,
commodities, or real assets, such as equities. Diversification, however, does
not necessarily kill the financial system.
Selling dollars and buying euros will appreciate the euro vis-à-vis the dol-
lar, undermine European international competitiveness, and export deflation
and unemployment to Europe. The dollar, however, will retain roughly the
same parity against East Asian currencies.Since the United States is their prin-
cipal export market,all East Asian economies have an incentive not to let their
currencies appreciate too much against the dollar or against the currencies of
rival East Asian economies.This incentive provides a centripetal force that sta-
bilizes the system.Similarly,purchases of commodities and equities may cause
commodity and asset price inflation, but these purchases also leave the dollar
exchange rate essentially unchanged.And to the extent that East Asian coun-
tries sell Treasury bonds,such sales drive up U.S.interest rates and provide an
incentive to remain invested in dollars.
A second objection concerns Eichengreen’s assumption that East Asian
economies ultimately face capital losses on dollar-reserve holdings. This
amounts to tacitly concluding that the international financial system 
is unstable. In fact, China could reap large capital gains on its holdings.
The logic of this speculation is as follows: China is resisting exchange-
rate appreciation to preserve its export-led growth model, while gradually
opening its capital markets to the international marketplace. This opening
could eventually trigger a depreciation of the renminbi if Chinese wealth
holders exit their domestic system for the purposes of economic and polit-
ical portfolio diversification.
4This speculative scenario would enable China
to make large capital gains on its reserve holdings and also get a second
wind for its export-led growth program.
The above scenario should be extremely troubling to U.S. policymak-
ers who are concerned about the U.S. industrial base, yet the U.S. Treasury
is actively promoting this development by demanding capital-market
openness.Once China liberalizes its capital markets and floats its exchange
rate, the United States can no longer claim that China is manipulating its
exchange rate,and the case for international legal action against China will
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disappear.Capital market openness and renminbi depreciation are the dia-
metric opposite of U.S. needs today. The U.S. trade balance and exchange
rate problems call for an upward revaluation of the renminbi without cap-
ital market openness,yet the U.S.Treasury’s policy runs the risk of promot-
ing the opposite outcome, similar to the mistakes made with Japan in the
early 1980s. At that time, Japan was running a large trade surplus and was
relatively closed, financially, to the rest of the world. The Treasury pushed
Japan to open its financial markets, resulting in undiversified Japanese
wealth holders investing overseas, which caused the yen to fall and in-
creased Japan’s trade surplus.
Goldstein and Lardy (2005) provide another criticism of DFG’s sus-
tainability claim. Their analysis combines positive and normative argu-
ments that the system will break down because of China’s high cost of
maintaining it, and asserts that a breakdown is in China’s best interests.
The principal focus of their analysis is the high cost to Chinese authorities
of sterilizing monetary inflows into China. To prevent exchange-rate
appreciation, China’s central bank sells renminbi, which increases the
money supply and poses inflationary dangers. In order to sterilize an
increase in the money supply, the bank sells domestic bonds and soaks up
excess liquidity. However, this action drives up interest rates and distorts
financial signals. To counter these effects, the central bank has turned to
administrative controls, such as higher reserve requirements on commer-
cial bank deposits, and higher administered deposit rates to attract and
retain bank deposits. Goldstein and Lardy believe, however, that these
measures are inadequate and that China will suffer from a combination of
costly inflation and financial system distortions that misallocate and waste
resources. Such costs, they say, will compel China to abandon its underval-
ued exchange rate.
Goldstein and Lardy’s other arguments against stability and sustainabil-
ity include challenging the underlying premise of the DFG hypothesis (that
export-led growth driven by FDI is critical for China’s industrialization),the
capital-loss-on-reserves argument put forward by Eichengreen,and an argu-
ment that revaluation leads to large terms-of-trade gains for China. These
gains will lower the domestic cost of commodity and capital goods imports
and will not have a large effect on Chinese manufactured exports, which
consist mainly of processed products based on imported inputs.
 The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 13
However, Goldstein and Lardy’s arguments are subject to important
counterarguments.
5 First, the sterilization-cost argument is essentially a
monetarist case, yet the empirical link between the money supply and
inflation is known to be highly variable and operates over a long time hori-
zon. China’s administrative controls have worked well so far and they may
continue to work with the assistance of minor adjustments. Second, China’s
stiff resistance to revaluation provides a “revealed preference” position by
China’s economic policy authorities regarding the importance of export-
led manufacturing growth.Third, as noted above, we cannot simply assume
that China will suffer capital losses on its reserve holdings. Fourth, China
has an alternative plan for dealing with financial sector resource misalloca-
tion: partial privatization of banks. The goal is that Western banks will
modernize and improve the banking system’s credit allocation function.
The financial sector can thereby be modernized,while simultaneously per-
sisting with export-led manufacturing growth.
B. A New Explanation of Instability 
DFG, Eichengreen, and Goldstein and Lardy all focus on the sustainability
of financing the U.S. trade deficit. While DFG believe the supply of financ-
ing is sustainable because it meets the needs of supplier (surplus) countries,
Eichengreen and Goldstein and Lardy believe the supply is unsustainable.
This brief argues that the international financial system is, indeed, unsus-
tainable and will crash. But it is unsustainable for reasons of demand and
not for reasons of supply. Existing analyses have overlooked the weakness
on the demand side because of failure to understand the microeconomics
of transactions within the current system.
An outline of the structure of U.S. and East Asia borrowing is shown in
the figure.The key insight is that the process of financing export-led growth
and the U.S. trade deficit is a two-part, intermediated transaction. One part
involves a domestic transaction between U.S. banks and ultimate U.S. bor-
rowers (consumers). The other part involves an international transaction
between foreign governments and financial intermediaries (banks) in the
U.S. financial markets. The domestic transaction can be loosely identified
with the demand for and provision of credit within the U.S. economy, and
borrowers use these funds to purchase goods. The international transaction
can be loosely identified with the supply of credit from East Asian economies
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to the U.S. economy, with East Asian economies taking American IOUs as
payment for the goods they have supplied. The system can break down in
either the international or domestic credit markets. Attention so far has
focused exclusively on the international credit market and the possible with-
drawal of financing by foreign lenders. The real reason the system is unsus-
tainable, however, may lie with the domestic credit market.
6
Export-led growth relies on selling goods in the U.S.market,which has
been described as “the buyer of last resort.” U.S. consumer spending has
been significantly financed by borrowing, which, in turn, has been sup-
ported by a housing price bubble. In effect, U.S. consumers borrow from
U.S. banks and buy Chinese goods, and China ultimately ends up accepting
those borrowed dollars as payment for its goods. The system is therefore
dependent on continuation of the U.S. consumption boom, yet circum-
stances could end that boom. First, the Fed may overshoot its interest rate–
tightening campaign and trigger recession. Second, local U.S. banks may
tighten lending standards and reduce lending, because households are
financially overextended and housing collateral is overvalued.A third pos-
sibility is that consumers may reduce spending voluntarily. An end to the
housing price bubble would eliminate future financial gains that con-
sumers could use as collateral,and adverse wage and income pressures gen-
erated by international outsourcing could spread from the manufacturing
sector to the service sector, which is relatively larger in size.
If U.S. consumption spending falls, East Asian exports would also
fall, and the willingness of East Asian economies to finance the U.S. trade
deficit would become redundant, as international financing would no
longer be a binding constraint. Instead, the constraint would lie with the
U.S. goods and domestic credit markets, and East Asian economies could
not force transactions within those markets by providing credit to U.S.
banks. Rather, the borrower (the U.S. consumer) and the local U.S. bank
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vulnerable to a crash that originates from within the United States,and East
Asian economies can do little about it. Indeed, the competitive pressures
unleashed by export-led growth and outsourcing form part of the constella-
tion of forces contributing toward a possible crash.
What Happens If the U.S. Economy Sinks into Recession? 
In the event that the United States falls into a consumer-led recession, East
Asia is likely to be affected significantly.The initial impact would be felt via
reduced exports, which would lower employment.A further impact would
be felt through reduced FDI.With excess capacity and diminishing exports,
multinationals would reduce new investments. These results would con-
trast with the effects of the 2001 U.S. recession, which was investment led
and left U.S.consumption spending intact.Consequently,East Asia was rel-
atively unscathed because its exports are mainly consumer goods.
The United States will find it difficult to escape a consumer-led reces-
sion. The 2001 recession was overcome by the combination of a budget 
U-turn (from surplus to massive deficit),a significant reduction in interest
rates (which spurred mortgage refinancing and reliquified household bal-
ance sheets),and consumer borrowing (which was collateralized by a hous-
ing price bubble). The budget U-turn option is no longer available, so the
only significant source of policy stimulus is for the Fed to cut interest rates.
Such cuts, however, will likely be much less effective than in the past. One
reason is that the stock of high-interest mortgages has already been depleted
and refinanced.Another reason is that lenders will be less inclined to lend,
given the financially stretched position of households.A third reason is that
house prices have already risen and are more likely to decline than continue
to rise. The net result is that interest rate reductions by the Fed could end
up akin to “pushing on a string.”
And what will happen to the dollar? Diminished U.S. economic
prospects will likely promote some portfolio shifting toward Europe and
Japan, who also rely on exports to the United States. This means that
Europe and Japan will be adversely affected by a U.S. recession, so the
incentive to invest in euros and yen will be diminished. East Asian coun-
tries will be keen to retain their competitiveness to diminish the impact of
lower exports.This suggests that they will continue to restrict the appreciation
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of their currencies against the dollar. The net result is that the dollar may
not fall very much, which will make it even more difficult for the United
States to overcome recession. The prognosis, therefore, is a prolonged eco-
nomic slump.
Wanted: A New Global Financial Architecture  
Not only do DFG see a stable international financial system, but they also
see significant welfare benefits for all participants. In one paper (2004b),
they argue that the surpluses earned by East Asian economies represent a
means to acquire foreign exchange collateral that is needed to underwrite
FDI. From DFG’s viewpoint, the system should be left intact.
One problem with the collateral argument is that Japan continues to
accumulate collateral when it clearly has no need for such collateral. More
important,DFG’s argument does not accord with the historical record about
the formation of the current international financial system. The system is a
product of recent events that were spurred by the East Asian financial crisis
in 1997.East Asian countries were forced to accept the currency devaluations
imposed by the panicking financial markets,but have subsequently benefited
from the impact of devaluation on exports. The resulting increase in their
trade surpluses then enabled them to build up massive foreign exchange
reserves as protection against future financial panics.
Several important conclusions follow from an assessment of develop-
ment after 1997. First, the accumulation of official reserves has not been
driven by a desire for collateral in order to underwrite FDI. Rather, the
accumulation has been driven by a desire to protect against the possibility
of future capital flight. Second, the current financial system is a product 
of state policy responses to unwelcome market developments, rather than
a product of optimizing markets, which is the view of many modern econ-
omists. Third, the system is problematic on a global scale for reasons 
discussed in Blecker (2000) and Palley (2003). In particular, the system
promotes global deflation by emphasizing exports excessively; this focus
hollows out the income and aggregate demand–generation process in the
United States via deindustrialization and outsourcing.
The core problems of the international financial system concern capi-
tal mobility and exchange rates.Destabilizing capital mobility was the main
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problem behind the East Asian financial crisis,while exchange rates are the
main problem behind today’s global financial imbalances.
A new financial system is needed to address both the root cause of
the 1997 East Asian financial crisis and the exchange rate problems that
have subsequently emerged. A contemporary financial architecture will
need to manage both capital mobility and exchange rates. Finally, it is
important to recognize that the existing system is a problem for both the
periphery and the center.After the East Asian crisis,the system focused on
changing the periphery. In reality, both the periphery and the center need
to change.
There have been many proposals for redesigning the global financial
architecture. Blecker (1999), Griffith-Jones and Kimmis (1999), and Palley
(1999) provide solutions for governing and improving the quality of capital
flows.Their solutions include improved prudential regulation,Chilean-style
speed bumps that implicitly tax short-term inflows, currency transaction
taxes, domestically imposed reserve requirements on lenders, and obliga-
tions for lenders to hedge foreign currency lending on behalf of borrowers.
The 1997 crisis was centered on capital mobility.Today’s problem is gross
trade imbalances,which have elevated the significance of exchange rate mis-
alignments and created the need for a more stable system of managed
exchange rates.The obvious candidate to solve the problem is a system with
a crawling band target zone,as proposed by Williamson (1985,1999),Bergsten
et al. (1999), Grieve-Smith (1999), and Weller and Singleton (2002). This
system involves choosing a number of parameters that would need to be
negotiated by participants: a target exchange rate, the band size in which
exchange rates can fluctuate, a hard or soft band, and the rate of crawl.
A hard band is automatically and decisively defended, while a soft band
allows for temporary marginal deviations outside the band with a commit-
ment to return within the band when market conditions are favorable. The
rate of crawl involves determining the rules governing the adjustment of the
target and band. These rules concern the size and periodicity of adjustment
to the target nominal exchange rate.
A sensible candidate regarding the target exchange rate is the notion of
fundamental equilibrium exchange rates proposed by Williamson (1994).
His basic notion is that participating countries select a set of exchange rates
consistent with their targeted current account and GDP outcomes.
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Finally, there needs to be agreement about the rules of intervention in
order to protect the target exchange rate. In the past, any country with a
weakening exchange rate was required to sell foreign exchange reserves in
order to protect the exchange rate. This system is fundamentally flawed
because countries have limited reserves and the market knows it.Speculators
therefore have an incentive to try and “break the bank”by shorting the weak-
ening currency, and they have a good possibility for success, given the scale
of low-cost leverage that modern financial markets can muster.
The onus of exchange rate intervention needs to be reversed. The
country with the stronger currency (where the central bank’s exchange rate
is appreciating) should be responsible for preventing appreciation, rather
than the country with the weaker currency being responsible for prevent-
ing depreciation. Since the central bank with the stronger currency has
unlimited amounts of its own currency for sale, the bank can never be
beaten by the market.Once this rule of intervention is adopted,speculators
will back off and the target exchange rate will be viable.This procedure rec-
ognizes and addresses the fundamental asymmetry in the defense of weak
or strong currencies.
Conclusion: Beyond Policy Passivity 
Today’s global financial system is a haphazard and suboptimal creation.
Whereas East Asian policymakers strategically manipulate their exchange
rates,U.S.policymakers reject intervention on the grounds that the market
knows what is best, so the exchange rate should be left alone. This asym-
metry between economies has allowed East Asia to pursue neomercantilist
policies that have contributed to massive global financial imbalances.
The mentality of U.S. policy is at odds with reason and the evidence.
Theoretical reasons abound for the belief that foreign exchange markets are
prone to herd behavior. Strong empirical evidence also indicates that
exchange rates depart from theoretically warranted equilibrium levels,
whether or not they are defined as purchasing power parity or as exchange
rates consistent with sustainable current account deficits. From the stand-
point of realpolitik,it is unwise for any country to be outgamed by another.
East Asian policymakers are correct in their belief that they can improve
economic outcomes through exchange rate intervention. As Williamson
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(1999) observes,policymakers who use theory to devise and manage sensi-
ble exchange rates do better than those who employ unregulated, floating
exchange rates. The problem is that East Asian countries have been inter-
vening in an uncooperative manner, which risks an outcome that could be
disastrous for the current international financial system.
Notes
1. Blecker (2000) and Palley (2003) have explored the global macroeco-
nomic inconsistencies of export-led growth.
2. DFG emphasize the connection between exports,foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI), and growth. Goldstein and Lardy (2005) have rightly
criticized them for overemphasizing the contribution of FDI to
China’s growth. However, that said, FDI is a critical component of
China’s capital and technology accumulation strategy. More impor-
tant,the link that should be emphasized is between exports and indus-
trial investment in general, with exports spurring both FDI and
domestic manufacturing investment. Exports provide the classic “vent
for surplus” in China’s economy. China’s entrepreneurial tradition
makes it highly efficient at organizing capital accumulation. However,
China has not yet put in place a domestic consumption market 
that can absorb its production. I emphasize this point in Palley
(2006a).
3. In the face of large gold conversions, especially by France, President
Nixon suspended the right of countries to convert official dollar
reserves into gold on August 15, 1971.
4. Chinese wealth holders will want to diversify for standard economic
reasons, as well as political reasons resulting from concerns about rule
of law in China and the potential for future political instability.
5. These arguments are developed in greater detail in Palley (2006a).
6. These arguments are developed in two of my policy briefs: Palley
(2006b) and Palley (2005).
7. Operationally for the single-country case, this is done as follows: The
first step is to empirically estimate a current account equation of the
form CA = α0 + α1Y + α2e + αXX, where CA = current account,
Y = GDP, e = exchange rate, and X = vector of exogenous variables.
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The equation is then solved to yield the fundamental equilibrium
exchange rate (e*) consistent with the target current account (CA*),
target GDP (Y*), and given levels of exogenous variables: e* = –α0/α2
– α1Y*/α2 + CA*/α2 – αXX/α2. In a multicountry exchange rate system,
these equations must be estimated and solved simultaneously across
countries to ensure a consistent set of exchange rates.It is necessary for
countries to agree on a consistent set of national current account 
targets, since all countries cannot run trade surpluses simultaneously.
References 
Bergsten, C. F., O. Davanne, and P. Jacquet. 1999.“The Case for Joint
Management of Exchange Rate Flexibility.”Working Paper 99-9,
Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C.
Blecker, R.A. 2000.“The Diminishing Returns to Export-led Growth.”
Paper prepared for the Council of Foreign Relations Working Group
on Development, New York.
———. 1999.“Taming Global Finance: A Better Architecture for Growth
and Equity.”Economic Policy Institute, Washington, D.C.
Dooley, M. P., D. Folkerts-Landau, and P. Garber. 2004a.“Direct
Investment, Rising Real Wages, and the Absorption of Excess Labor in
the Periphery.”Working Paper 10626, Cambridge, Massachusetts:
National Bureau of Economic Research, July.
———. 2004b.“The U.S. Current Account Deficit and Economic 
Development: Collateral for a Total Return Swap.”Working Paper
10727, Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic
Research,August.
———. 2003.“An Essay on the Revised Bretton Woods System.”Working
Paper 9971, Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of
Economic Research, September.
Eichengreen, B. 2004.“The Dollar and the New Bretton Woods System.”
Manuscript, University of California, Berkeley. December.
Goldstein, M., and N. R. Lardy. 2005.“China’s Role in the Revived 
Bretton Woods System: A Case of Mistaken Identity.”Working Paper
WP 05-02, Institute for International Economics, Washington,
D.C. March.
 The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 21
Grieve-Smith, J. 1999.“A New Bretton Woods: Reforming the Global
Financial System”in Michie and Grieve-Smith,eds.,Global Instability: The
Political Economy of World Economic Governance. London: Routledge.
Griffith-Jones, S., and J. Kimmis. 1999.“Stabilizing Capital Flows to
Developing Countries”in Michie and Grieve-Smith, eds., Global
Instability: The Political Economy of World Economic Governance.
London: Routledge.
Palley, T. I. 2006a.“External Contradictions of the Chinese Development
Model: Export-led Growth and the Dangers of Global Economic
Contraction.”Journal of Contemporary China, 46 (February), 69–88.
———. 2006b.“Export-led Growth: The Elephant in the Room.”
www.thomaspalley.com, January 13.
———. 2005.“Two Views about a Possible Hard Landing: Foreign Flight
versus Consumer Burnout.”www.thomaspalley.com, December 23.
———. 2003.“Export-led Growth: Is There Any Evidence of Crowding-
Out?”in P.Arestis, M. Baddeley, and J. McCombie, eds., Globalisation,
Regionalism, and Economic Activity. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar.
———. 1999.“International Finance and Global Deflation: There Is an
Alternative”in Michie and Grieve-Smith, eds., Global Instability: The
Political Economy of World Economic Governance. London: Routledge.
Weller, C., and L. Singleton. 2002.“Reining in Exchange Rates: A Better
Way to Stabilize the Global Economy.”Briefing Paper No. 131,
Economic Policy Institute, Washington, D.C., September.
Williamson, J. 1999.“Crawling Bands or Monitoring Bands: How to
Manage Exchange Rates in a World of Capital Mobility.”Policy Brief
99-3, Institute for International Economics,Washington, D.C.
———. 1994.“Estimating Equilibrium Exchange Rates.”Institute for
International Economics, Washington, D.C.
———. 1985.“The Exchange Rate System.”Revised edition, Institute for
International Economics, Washington, D.C.
 22 Public Policy Brief, No. 85
Thomas I. Palley is an economist living in Washington, D.C. He was for-
merly chief economist with the U.S.–China Economic and Security Review
Commission.Prior to joining the commission,he was director of the Open
Society Institute’s Globalization Reform Project and assistant director of
public policy at the AFL–CIO. He is the founder of Economics for
Democratic and Open Societies,which seeks to stimulate public discussion
about the kinds of economic arrangements and conditions needed to pro-
mote democracy and open societies.
Palley has published in numerous journals, including the Atlantic
Monthly, American Prospect, and Nation magazines. He is the author of
Plenty of Nothing: The Downsizing of the American Dream and the Case for
Structural Keynesianism(Princeton University Press 1998) and Post Keynesian
Economics (Macmillan Press 1996). Some recent policy articles include
“External Contradictions of the Chinese Development Model,” Journal of
Contemporary China, February 2006; “The Questionable Legacy of Alan
Greenspan,” Challenge, November–December 2005; “The Economic Case
for International Labor Standards,” Cambridge Journal of Economics,
January 2004; and “Asset Price Bubbles and the Case for Asset-Based
Reserve Requirements,”Challenge, May–June 2003.
Palley holds a B.A. degree in modern history and economics from
Oxford University and an M.A. in international relations and Ph.D. in 
economics from Yale University.
About the AuthorThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 23
The full text of the Public Policy Brief and Public Policy Brief Highlights
series can be downloaded from the Levy Institute website, www.levy.org.
The site also includes a complete list and short summaries of all the titles
in the Public Policy Brief series.
To order a copy, call 845-758-7700 or 202-887-8464 (in Washington,
D.C.), fax 845-758-1149, e-mail info@levy.org, or write to The Levy
Economics Institute of Bard College, Blithewood, PO Box 5000,
Annandale-on-Hudson, NY 12504-5000.
The Fallacy of the Revised Bretton Woods Hypothesis 
Why Today’s International Financial System Is Unsustainable
 . 
No. 85, 2006 (Highlights, No. 85A)
Can Basel II Enhance Financial Stability?
A Pessimistic View 
.  
No. 84, 2006 (Highlights, No. 84A)
Reforming Deposit Insurance
The Case to Replace FDIC Protection with Self-Insurance 
 
No. 83, 2006 (Highlights, No. 83A)
The Ownership Society
Social Security Is Only the Beginning . . .
.  
No. 82, 2005 (Highlights, No. 82A)
Public Policy Brief Series24 Public Policy Brief, No. 85
Breaking Out of the Deficit Trap
The Case Against the Fiscal Hawks
 . 
No. 81, 2005 (Highlights, No. 81A)
The Fed and the New Monetary Consensus
The Case for Rate Hikes, Part Two
.  
No. 80, 2004 (Highlights, No. 80A)
The Case for Rate Hikes
Did the Fed Prematurely Raise Rates?
.  
No. 79, 2004 (Highlights, No. 79A)
The War on Poverty after 40 Years
A Minskyan Assessment
 .  and .  
No. 78, 2004 (Highlights, No. 78A)
The Sustainability of Economic Recovery in the United States
The Risks to Consumption and Investment
  and  
No. 77, 2004 (Highlights, No. 77A)
Asset Poverty in the United States 
Its Persistence in an Expansionary Economy
  and  . 
No. 76, 2004 (Highlights, No. 76A)
Is Financial Globalization Truly Global?
New Institutions for an Inclusive Capital Market
  and  
No. 75, 2003 (Highlights, No. 75A)
 N
O
N
P
R
O
F
I
T
 
O
R
G
A
N
I
Z
A
T
I
O
N
U
.
S
.
 
P
O
S
T
A
G
E
 
P
A
I
D
B
A
R
D
C
O
L
L
E
G
E
T
h
e
 
L
e
v
y
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
s
 
I
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
e
 
o
f
 
B
a
r
d
 
C
o
l
l
e
g
e
B
l
i
t
h
e
w
o
o
d
P
O
 
B
o
x
 
5
0
0
0
A
n
n
a
n
d
a
l
e
-
o
n
-
H
u
d
s
o
n
,
 
N
Y
 
1
2
5
0
4
-
5
0
0
0
A
d
d
r
e
s
s
 
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
 
R
e
q
u
e
s
t
e
d